ははあ、そうか、そうか。次期東アジアのウクライナに指名を預かったか。米ネオコン文化の華ランド研究所が言ってんだな。
オメデトウ、日本！米ネオコンのハエある奴隷の地位に選ばれて。
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Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Indo-Pacific Assessing the Positions of U.S. Allies JEFFREY W. HORNUNG May 6, 2022 PDF |
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• Because of Japan’s willingness to strengthen its alliance with the United States and pursue efforts to bolster its own defense capabilities vis-à-vis China, Japan is the regional ally that appears most likely to host U.S. GBIRMs. That possibility, however, remains low, heavily caveated by the challenge of accepting any increase in U.S. presence and deploying weapons that are explicitly offensive in nature. • A U.S. strategy that relies heavily on an ally agreeing to permanently host GBIRMs during peacetime would face serious risks of failure due to an inability to find a willing partner. |
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RECOMMENDATIONS The report also examines four possible alternatives to permanent basing of these missile systems on the territories of U.S. allies: (1) U.S. co-development of GBIRMs with and/or sales of GBIRMs to an ally for it to command and control as its own, (2) U.S. deployment of GBIRMs to an allied territory in a crisis situation, (3) peacetime rotational deployment, and (4) deployment on Guam or one of the Compact of Free Association states. Because each of these alternatives faces drawbacks, the report recommends a variation of the first alternative—should the United States continue to pursue GBIRMs for this region. |
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Specifically, instead of a focus on deployment of U.S. GBIRMs, the option most likely to succeed would be to help Japan in its efforts to develop and deploy an arsenal of ground-based, anti-ship standoff missile capabilities. Although this option is not a U.S. GBIRM, it should be seen as a first step in a longer-term U.S. strategy in which, over time, the United States might be able to encourage Japan to procure, either on its own or together with the United States, anti-ship cruise missiles with longer ranges. Although these missiles still would not be capable of deep strikes into China, if they were deployed on Japan’s southwestern islands or even Kyūshū, they would be able to cover ship movements in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and some of China’s east coast, thereby extending the range at which Chinese assets could be held at war-planning risk and potentially contributing to a maritime interdiction mission in the Taiwan Strait. |
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日本のみなさん、さらなる応援をしましょう、岸田文雄なる米ポチを！ |
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岸田政権の対ロ制裁措置に対するロシアの対日対抗措置 浅井基文 3/23/2022 |
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ロシアのウクライナに対する軍事侵攻に対して、西側メディア(及びそれを受け売りする能しかない日本メディア)の「ロシア＝侵略者、ウクライナ＝犠牲者」宣伝に洗脳された日本社会が「ウクライナ支援」一色に染まる中、バイデン政権に忠誠を尽くすこと(G7の一員として行動すること)しか念頭にない岸田政権も負けじとばかり、ロシア政府関係者の資産凍結制裁措置(2月27日)、一部のロシア銀行に対するSWIFTからの締め出し(2月28日)、ロシアに対する最恵国待遇取り消し(３月12日、正式決定は16日)、ロシア外務省のザハロヴァ報道官、8名のロシア国防省次官を含む15人の個人に対する追加制裁(３月18日)等々を発動しています。〔･･･〕安倍晋三氏が「トランプのポチ」だったとしたら、岸田文雄首相は「バイデンのポチ」そのものです。 |
